Explanations of ISO/IEC 27005:2018
The source is ISO/IEC 27005:2018(en), third edition, July 2018. Title: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security…
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For: V, IA
Source: ISO/IEC 27005:2018(en), English. 8.1, 8.2, Annexes B, C and D only as informative examples
8.1 takes as input the basic criteria, the scope and boundaries, and the organization of the process. The action: risks should be identified, described quantitatively or qualitatively, and prioritized against evaluation criteria and objectives relevant to the organization.
The implementation guidance describes a risk as the combination of the consequences that would follow from the occurrence of an unwanted event and the likelihood of that occurrence. The terms from ISO/IEC 27000 apply according to Clause 3. That edition is not available. The description in 8.1 is that of the guidance at this point, not a definition substituted from memory.
The assessment quantifies the risk or describes it qualitatively and enables management to prioritize risks according to the perceived severity or other specified criteria. It consists of identification (8.2), analysis (8.3) and evaluation (8.4). It determines the value of the information assets, identifies applicable threats and existing or possible vulnerabilities, identifies existing controls and their effect on the identified risk, determines the possible consequences and prioritizes the derived risks against the evaluation criteria set in the context.
It is often carried out in two or more iterations. First a high level, in order to recognize possibly high risks that deserve a further assessment. The next iteration can deepen these. If that is not enough, further analyses follow, probably on parts of the scope and possibly with another method. The organization chooses its approach according to the objectives of the assessment. Approaches are discussed in Annex E, see 27005-05. Output: a list of assessed risks, prioritized according to the evaluation criteria.
8.2.1: the purpose of identification is to determine what can happen and cause a possible loss, and to gain insight into how, where and why the loss can happen. The steps of the following subclauses should collect the input data for the analysis. The identification should include risks whether or not their source is under the control of the organization, even if the source or the cause is perhaps not identifiable. The note says the activities of the following subclauses could be carried out in a different order depending on the method.
8.2.2 Assets. Input: scope and boundaries, a list of the components with owners, location, function. The action: the assets within the specified scope should be identified. An asset is anything that has value for the organization and therefore requires protection. An information system consists of more than hardware and software. The identification should be at a level of detail that is sufficient for the assessment. The depth influences the amount of information collected and can be refined in later iterations. For each asset an owner should be identified who bears responsibility and accountability for the asset. The owner perhaps has no property right, but has responsibility for production, development, maintenance, use and security, as far as appropriate. Often that person is the appropriate person to determine the value of the asset for the organization, see 8.3.2. The boundary of the examination is the scope of the assets that are handled by the process. Output: a list of the assets to be handled and a list of the associated business processes and their relevance.
8.2.3 Threats. Input comes from the review of incidents, from owners, users and other sources, including external threat catalogues. Threats and their sources should be identified. A threat has the potential to harm assets such as information, processes and systems and thereby organizations. It can be of natural or human origin, and accidental or deliberate. Both sources should be identified. A threat can come from inside or outside. It should be identified in general and by type, for example unauthorized actions, physical damage, technical failures, and, where appropriate, then the individual threat within the type. Some threats can affect several assets and, depending on the asset, have different impacts. Input to the identification and to the estimation of likelihood, see 8.3.3, can come from owners, users, human resources, facilities management, specialists in information security and physical security, the legal department and other parties, including weather services, insurers and authorities. The environment and the culture should also be taken into account. Internal experience from incidents and earlier assessments should enter the current assessment. Other catalogues can supplement the list of general threats. Anyone who uses catalogues or earlier assessments should know that relevant threats change continually, especially when the business environment or the information systems change. Output: a list of threats with type and source.
8.2.4 Existing controls. Input: documentation of the controls, implementation plans for the treatment. Existing and planned controls should be identified. That should avoid unnecessary work or cost, for example a duplicate control. In addition it should be checked whether the controls work correctly. A reference to ISMS audit reports that already exist should limit the effort. If a control does not work as expected, that can cause vulnerabilities. It should be borne in mind that a selected control or strategy fails in operation and that supplementary controls are needed. Planned controls should be regarded like those already implemented. An existing or planned control can be recognized as ineffective, insufficient or not justified. If it is not justified or not sufficient, it should be examined whether it is removed, replaced by a more suitable one or left in place, for example for reasons of cost. The following can be helpful: review of documents, and if the processes are well documented, all existing or planned controls and their implementation status should be available; conversations with the responsible persons and the users; an on-site examination, comparison with the list of what should be present, and checking whether what has been implemented works correctly and effectively; review of audit results. “Can be helpful”. Output: a list of all existing and planned controls and of their status of implementation and use.
8.2.5 Vulnerabilities. Input: known threats, lists of the assets and of the existing controls. Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threats in order to harm assets or the organization should be identified. They can be recognized in these areas: organization, processes and procedures, management routines, personnel, physical environment, configuration of the information system, hardware, software or communications equipment, dependence on external parties. The presence of a vulnerability does not by itself cause harm. It needs a threat that exploits it. A vulnerability without an associated threat may not require a control, but should be recognized and watched for changes. “May not require”. A control that is incorrectly implemented, works faultily or is used incorrectly can itself be a vulnerability. A control can be effective or ineffective depending on the environment. Conversely, a threat without an associated vulnerability may not lead to a risk. “May not”. Vulnerabilities can be connected with properties of the asset that are used differently from what was intended at acquisition or at manufacture. Sources inside and outside the asset are, according to the wording of the guidance, to be considered. “Need to be considered”, not “shall”. Output: a list of vulnerabilities in relation to assets, threats and controls, and a list of vulnerabilities with no identified threat, for review.
8.2.6 Consequences. Input: assets, business processes, threats and vulnerabilities, where appropriate related to assets and their relevance. The consequences that losses of confidentiality, integrity and availability can have for the assets should be identified. A consequence can be loss of effectiveness, adverse operating conditions, loss of business, reputation, harm. The activity identifies harm or consequences that an incident scenario can cause. An incident scenario is the description of a threat that exploits a particular vulnerability or a set of vulnerabilities in an information security incident. The impact is to be determined under the impact criteria from the context. “Is to be determined”. It can affect one or more assets or part of an asset. Financial costs and business consequences can be assigned to assets when they are damaged or compromised. Consequences can be temporary or permanent, as with the destruction of an asset. Organizations should identify the operational consequences of incident scenarios, among other things: time for investigation and repair, lost working time, lost opportunity, health and safety, financial cost of special skills for remediation, image, reputation and goodwill. “But not limited to”. Details on the assessment of technical vulnerabilities are in B.3. Output: a list of incident scenarios with their consequences, related to assets and business processes.
Annex B is informative. B.1 distinguishes, as examples, primary assets, business processes and activities and information, and supporting assets on which the primary elements rely: hardware, software, network, personnel, site, structure of the organization. The identification of primary assets is described by a mixed working group. Some investigations do not need an exhaustive analysis. The lists of supporting assets and the valuation scales in B.2 are not copied here. B.3 deals with the impact assessment in the annex. These are examples and explanations, not a mandatory classification beside 8.2.2.
Annex C is informative and gives examples of typical threats. The list can be used during the assessment. Threats can be deliberate, accidental or environmental. The groups are not in a rank order. The table is not copied. A missing row is not a nonconformity.
Annex D is informative. D.1 gives examples of vulnerabilities and of threats that can exploit them, and stresses that in some cases other threats can exploit the same vulnerabilities. D.2 says proactive methods such as the testing of information systems can be used, depending on the criticality of the ICT system and the resources available. Named are an automated tool for vulnerability scanning, security testing and evaluation, penetration testing and code review, and also interviews, questionnaires, physical inspection and document analysis. The tool can produce false positive results, because it does not take the environment of the site into account. Penetration tests can produce false results if the vulnerability is not successfully exploited. A crash or restart of the process or system under test should, according to the annex, also count as a vulnerability. “Can” and “should” of the informative annex. An obligation to use any one of these procedures does not stand in 8.2.5.
The introduction says the method through assets, threats and vulnerabilities is no longer required by ISO/IEC 27001. 8.2 nevertheless describes it as the steps of this guidance, with the note that the order can depend on the method. Annex E additionally describes a high-level assessment that can begin with the consequences, see 27005-05.
Not in this text: the tables from Annexes B, C and D, a mandatory inventory format, and the statement that every organization must work through the steps of 8.2 in this order because ISO/IEC 27001 requires that. The introduction of this guidance does not say that.